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We study the evolution of cooperation in the collective-risk social dilemma game, where the risk is
determined by a collective target that must be reached with individual contributions. All players initially
receive endowments from the available amount of common resources.While cooperators contribute part of
their endowment to the collective target, defectors do not. If the target is not reached, the endowments of all
players are lost. In our model, we introduce a feedback between the amount of common resources and the
contributions of cooperators. We show that cooperation can be sustained only if the common resources are
preserved but never excessively abound. This, however, requires a delicate balance between the amount of
common resources that initially exist, and the amount cooperators contribute to the collective target.
Exceeding critical thresholds in either of the two amounts leads to loss of cooperation, and consequently to
the depletion of common resources.
E
nsuring sustainable use of environmental, social, and technological resources is a global challenge1. Stripped
of particularities, the problem is essentially that of responsive use of public goods2. If the public goods are
not managed responsibly, the ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’3 is unavoidable. The public goods game is
traditionally employed as a theoretical model that describes the social dilemma that emerges when individual
short-term interests are inherently different from what would be best for the society as a whole4. Governed by
group interactions, the public goods game requires that players decide simultaneously whether they wish to
contribute to the common pool, i.e., to cooperate, or not. Regardless of the chosen strategy, each member of the
group receives an equal share of the public good after the initial investments aremultiplied by a synergy factor that
takes into account the added value of collaborative efforts. Evidently, individuals are best off by not contributing
anything to the common pool, i.e., by defecting, while the group would be most successful if everybody
cooperated.
Althoughmanymechanisms are known that promote the evolution of cooperation in the public goods game5–7,
such as punishment8–14, reward15–17, and social diversity18,19, it has recently been argued that the collective-risk
social dilemma game might be more appropriate for capturing the essence of several realistic problems concern-
ing the conservation of common resources20. In particular, the collective-risk social dilemma game describes how
the failure to reach a declared collective target can have severe long-term consequences. Opting out of carbon
emission reduction to harvest short-term economic benefits is a typical example21. The description of the game is
as follows. All players within a group are considered to have an initial endowment that comes from the common
pool of available resources. While cooperators contribute a fraction of their endowment to the collective target,
defectors retain everything for themselves. The risk level is determined by a collective target that should be
reached with the contributions of cooperators. If a group fails to reach this target, all members of the group lose
their remaining endowments, while otherwise the endowments are retained. The collective-risk social dilemma
game thus accounts directly for the depletion of common resources that may result from opting out of coopera-
tion. Recent experimental and theoretical studies have shown that high risk of collective failure raises the chances
for coordinated socially responsible actions22–27.
However, existingmodelling studies have assumed that the contributions of cooperators are independent of the
available amount of common resources. Here we depart from this traditional setup by introducing a feedback
between the amount of common resources and the amount cooperators contribute to the collective target. Our
assumption is that in a harsh environment, when common resources are scarce, cooperators are likely to
contribute less. On the other hand, if common resources abound, it seems more reasonable to expect larger
contributions towards the collective target. Previous theoretical research has already considered various feed-
backs between cooperation and the environment28–30, while a thoroughly documented experimental example is
the resource competition in populations of yeast31–33. Yeast prefers to use the monosaccharides glucose and
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fructose as carbon sources.When these sugars are not available, yeast
can metabolize alternative carbon sources such as the disaccharide
sucrose by producing and secreting the enzyme invertase. The pro-
duction and secretion of invertase is costly, yet it creates a common
resource that can be consumed by the whole population. It has been
reported that increasing the amount of glucose available in themedia
promotes the growth of defectors (yeast that do not production and
secretion invertase), thus decreasing the fraction of cooperators at
equilibrium and even driving the cooperators to extinction. On the
other hand, as the cooperators decreases in frequency, the amount of
glucose which sucrose is hydrolyzed to also decreases32. Therefore, in
this example, there exists a feedback between the density of coopera-
tors and the amount of monosaccharides in the media33.
We would like to emphasize that our model is not meant to
describe a particular experiment, like the resource competition in
populations of yeast that we have just described. Instead, we wish
to draw on this example and use it as motivation to propose a min-
imalist model for a proof of principle — namely that the excessive
abundance of common resources may hinder the evolution of coop-
eration in the collective-risk social dilemma game. Previous models
of public goods have ignored resource dynamics in the common
pool, and they have also ignored the fact that cooperative behaviours
can be influenced by the degree of resources in the common pool. In
the proposedmodel, we therefore assume that there exists a common
resource, a non-empty pool, which provides an initial endowment to
every player. Subsequently, every individual must decide whether a
certain amount of this endowment will be used to refill the pool or
not. Refilling the pool is a socially responsible act of cooperation.
Importantly, in subsequent rounds, the endowment issued to every
player is proportional to the updated amount of the common
resource. If the pool is emptying, the endowments will be less and
less, and vice versa if the common resource is managed profitably.
However, if the resources in the pool become abundant, we impose
an upper bound on the endowment, corresponding to the fact that
each individual only needs asmuch resources from the commonpool
to be completely satisfied33,34. The question that we aim to answer is
how does the described feedback affect the evolution of coopera-
tion35. We perform simulations of the collective-risk social dilemma
game on structured populations. In the next section, we present
results that we have obtained on the square lattice, while results for
several other interaction networks are summarized in the Supple-
mentary Information that accompanies this paper.
Results
Webegin by presenting colourmaps encoding the stationary fraction
of cooperators rc in dependence on both the multiplication factor a
and the initial amount of common resources R for three different
values of the maximal possible endowment b. Several interesting
conclusions can be drawn from the results presented in Fig. 1.
First, it can be observed at a glance that increasing b (from left to
right) increases rc over wide regions of a and R. This suggests that if
common resources in the population abound, they should be dis-
tributed rather than held back. Although this seems to go against
cautionary usage and conservation, holding back has, in the long run,
several unintended consequences. If the common resources are not
distributed right away, defectors can exploit the accumulated stock
long after cooperators have disappeared from the neighbourhood.
This creates an evolutionary niche for free-riders by means of which
they can rise to complete dominance.
The impact of a and R is not as straightforward. As can be inferred
fromFig. 1, only intermediate values of a ensure rc. 0.However, the
span of the optimal interval depends on the maximal endowment b.
The larger the maximal endowment b, the broader the interval of
suitable values of a. Moreover, there exists an upper bound on R,
beyond which cooperators cannot survive. The maximal R increases
slightly with increasing b, but the effect is rather small. Conversely,
even if initially the common resources are very scarce, cooperators
are not negatively affected provided a and b are from within the
limits that ensure rc . 0. This suggests that cooperative behaviour
may develop even under adverse conditions, and it is in fact more
likely to do so than under abundance. The extinction of cooperators
at both too large R and too large a indicates that an excessive abund-
ance of common resources acts detrimental on the evolution of
cooperation, and that thus it deters social responsibility.
To further support our conclusions, we show in Fig. 2(a) the
fraction of groups where the cumulative common goods can be sus-
tained at equilibrium [i.e., Ri(‘). 0], and in Fig. 2(b) the fraction of
groups where the cumulative common goods can provide enough
endowments [i.e., Ri(‘) $ Gb] for all involved. It can be observed
that, in comparison to Fig. 1, the fraction of sustainable groups is
larger than zero in a broader region of parameter values. It is much
higher than the corresponding fraction of cooperators for large a. In
combination with Fig. 1, we thus find that there exists an intermedi-
ate region of a that enables cooperators to dominate the population,
as well as maintains a sufficient level of common goods in each group
for individuals to be fully satisfied. Although the region for such a
complete win-win outcome is not broad, it can be broadened by
increasing the value of b.
The series of snapshots presented in Fig. 3 offers an insight as to
what causes the described evolutionary outcomes. We use different
colours not just for cooperators and defectors, but also depending on
the available amount of common resources. More precisely, blue
(yellow) colour denotes cooperators (defectors) that are central to
groups where Ri(t) $ Gb. On the other hand, green (red) colour
denotes cooperators (defectors) where Ri(t),Gb. Grey are defectors
where there are no more common resources left (note that Ri(t) is
Figure 1 | Socially responsible actions are viable even if the common resources are initially scarce, as long as the common pool is subsequently kept
properly filled. Either too low or too abundant contributions, or failure to distribute them in time, can lead to the tragedy of the commons. Colour
maps encode the fraction of cooperators rc in dependence on the multiplication factor a and the initial amount of common resources available to each
group R, for three different values of the maximal endowment b: (a) 5, (b) 10, and (c) 20.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Figure 2 | Sustainability of common resources is achieved by socially responsible actions. Only an intermediate contribution strength, combined
with initially scarce resources, leads to sustainable common resources. In panel (a) the colourmap encodes the fraction of groups where the resources can
be sustained [i.e., Ri(‘) . 0], while in panel (b) the colour map encodes the fraction of groups where the cumulative common goods can provide
enough endowments [i.e., Ri(‘) $ Gb] for all involved. For results in both panels we use the maximal endowment b 5 10.
Figure 3 | Spatial patterns explain why an excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility. Blue (yellow) are cooperators
(defectors) that are central to groups where the common resources abound, while green (red) are cooperators (defectors) that are central to groups where
the common resources are scarce. Grey denotes defectors where the common resources are completely depleted. Top row show the time evolution (from
left to right) for a5 1, b5 10, and R5 50. Due to the lowmultiplication factor the common resources vanish fast. Middle row shows the time evolution
for a 5 10, b 5 10, and R 5 50. Here only cooperative groups succeed in keeping the pool from emptying. Groups with defectors quickly become
unsustainable and hence pave the way towards cooperator dominance. Bottom row show the time evolution for a5 20, b5 10, and R5 50. Due to the
high value of a common resources start to abound excessively, making even predominantly defective groups sustainable and thus fit to invade
cooperators.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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always larger than zero if cooperators are present). For clarity, we
always begin with Ri(0) 5 Gb. Accordingly, blue cooperators and
yellow defectors are initially distributed uniformly at random (left-
most panels of Fig. 3).
For low a (top row of Fig. 3), the common resources are depleted
fast. Defectors turn to red and cooperators turn to green, and wide-
spread grey patches occur only after a few iterations of the game.
Soon all is left are isolated islands of defectors who exploit the few
remaining cooperators, until eventually all common resources van-
ish. Consequently, grey defectors come to dominate the entire popu-
lation. This scenario is characteristic for the case when short-term
benefits and ineffective cooperative efforts prevent sustainable man-
agement of common resources.
For intermediate a (middle row of Fig. 3), the scenario is very
different. Grouped cooperators are able to preserve and enrich their
resources, while groups with defectors fail to do so. Blue cooperative
domains, where the common resources abound, become separated
from red defectors by strips of green cooperators, which essentially
protect the blue domains from being exploited further. The interfaces
where green cooperators and red defectors meet become the shield
that protects blue cooperative domains. In fact, blue cooperators are
able to spread by means of an indirect territorial battle. It is import-
ant to note that yellow defectors are practically non-existent, i.e., a
defector cannot sustain a profitable group, and accordingly areas of
grey soon emerge. These defectors become easy targets once being
exposed to blue cooperators.
For high a (bottom row of Fig. 3), the situation changes again. Here
the effectiveness of cooperators is so high that even a few in each group
are able to provide more than enough resources for defectors.
Accordingly, yellow defectors emerge, which can prevail even against
blue domains of cooperators. Note that defectors still have an evolu-
tionary advantage stemming from their refusal to sacrifice a fraction of
personal benefits for the conservation of common resources. The
stationary state is thus a diverse mix of all possible states, where
defectors are more widespread since they don’t contribute to the
common pool. Nevertheless, if a is not too large some cooperators
can still prevail by forming clusters, which as for intermediate values of
a are shielded by green cooperators. The ‘‘shield’’, however, is not very
effective and accordingly has many holes, manifesting rather as iso-
lated green cooperators which signal loss of the blue status rather than
forming a compact chain that would prevent the invasion of defectors.
If a is larger still (not shown), the utter abundance of common
resources leads to the complete dominance of defectors, and ultimately
to the tragedy of the commons as for low values of a. The evolutionary
path is significantly different though, given that for large a the tragedy
is preceded by widespread yellow (rich) rather than red (poor) defec-
tors. It is also worth noting that large initial values of R result in an
identical demise of cooperation as large values of a.
To verify the robustness of the presented results, we conclude this
section by considering several variations of the proposed collective-
risk social dilemma game. In particular, we have studied the effects of
(i) the population size, (ii) the topology of the population structure,
(iii) different uncertainties by strategy adoptions, (iv) the delay in
individual strategy updating, (v) the birth-death update rule36, as well
as (vi) the effects of cooperator’s priority towards limited endow-
ments32. Since the obtained results are not central to the main mess-
age of this study, we present all the details and the obtained results in
the Supplementary Information. Most importantly, we find that on
structured populations our conclusions remain intact under all con-
sidered circumstances, thus indicating a high degree of universality.
Nevertheless, we emphasize that our conclusions could be challenged
under well-mixed conditions. Well-mixing will break up the clusters
that we have described in the preceding paragraphs, and this may
change the results in favour of non-cooperation. This may be par-
ticularly relevant for human cooperation6,37, where themovements of
and between groups could introduce well-mixed conditions.
Discussion
We have shown that an excessive abundance of common resources
deters socially responsible actions on structured populations. If
either the common resources are initially too many, if the coopera-
tors are too effective in refilling the pool, or if the maximally allowed
endowments are too low for allowing an immediate dissemination of
accumulated goods, the defectors are able to take full advantage of
their refrain from contributing without suffering the consequences.
If sufficiently abundant, the excess allows defectors to free-ride well
over the time horizon that is required for cooperators to die out.
Once this happens the tragedy of the commons cannot be averted.
Less surprisingly, if initially the commons resources are absent, or if
the efforts of cooperators are ineffective to a degree that the pool
becomes empty, the tragedy sets in as well.
The key to sustainability is to properly adjust maximal endow-
ments, which must go hand in hand with the availability of common
resources. An abundance of common resources must be felt by all
individuals belonging to the group, and the rewards must be admini-
strated fast. This reinforces social responsibility and reimburses
cooperators for their preceding selfless efforts. Failure to do so sooner
or later means that the common resources are there for the taking
without the need to cooperate. A downward spiral emerges, because
the depletion of common resources averts from cooperation also
those that previously might have felt it was a viable strategy to adopt.
All that is eventually left is a depleted common resource and wide-
spread defection, despite the brief period of excessive abundance.
Based on our findings, as well as based on existing theoretical and
experimental research31,32,38–41, we may conclude that cooperation is
the more likely outcome if initially the common resources are scarce
rather than abundant. In particular, this conclusion is in agreement
with data from experiments conducted on yeast31,32 as well as on
social vertebrates42. In particular, when the amount of glucose avail-
able in the media is increased, defective yeast that do not pay a cost
for producing invertase can spread faster than cooperative yeast,
even driving cooperative yeast to extinction31,32. Similarly, experi-
ments on social vertebrates indicate that unfavourable envir-
onmental conditions, where resources are limited, reduce social
conflict and make social vertebrates more cooperative42. We hope
that the demonstrated importance of the feedback between coopera-
tive behavior and the availability of common resources will inspire
further research aimed at understanding the evolution of coopera-
tion, not least in human societies6, where the consideration of mobil-
ity might lead to particularly interesting results.
Methods
The game is staged on a L 3 L square lattice with periodic boundary conditions. As
demonstrated in the Supplementary Information, changing the topology of the
interaction network does not affect themain conclusions of this study. Each player on
site xwith vonNeumann neighborhood is amember of five overlapping groups of size
G5 5, and it is initially designated either as a cooperator (sx5 1) or defector (sx5 0)
with equal probability. At time t, the endowment aix from group i is defined as
aix~
b if Ri tð Þ§Gb,
Ri tð Þ=G if Ri tð ÞvGb,

ð1Þ
where Ri(t) is the amount of common resources (public goods) available to the group
at the time, and b determines the maximal possible endowment an individual is able
to receive. As noted before, this is to take into account that there is only so much an
individual needs33,34, regardless of how abundant the common resource may become.
Cooperators contribute a fixed amount c to the common pool in order to prevent its
depletion. Defectors contribute nothing. Accordingly, the payoff of player x from
group i is thus Pix~a
i
x{sxc, while the total payoff Px is simply the sum over all P
i
x
received from groups where x is a member.
We note that the introduction of a ceiling (b) to the endowment is the simplest way
by means of which we take into account that, beyond a certain amount, higher
endowments will yield no additional returns. Future modelling studies could address
more realistic scenarios, for example such where fitness gains continue to increase
with increasing endowment but there are diminishing returns. While we do not
expect qualitatively different results, the gradual decline of returns with higher
endowments might delay the onset of cooperation and affect the parameter values at
which we observe the highest levels of cooperative behavior.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Starting with Ri(0) 5 R in all groups, the amount of common resources in each
group i is updated according to
Ri tz1ð Þ~Ri tð Þz
X
x[i
asxc{a
i
x
 
, ð2Þ
where a is the multiplication factor to the amount cooperators contribute to refilling
the pool, thus taking into account synergetic effects of group efforts. For simplicity, we
set c5 1, while b, R and a are the three key parameters determining the evolutionary
dynamics of the game.
After each round of the game, player x is given the opportunity to imitate the
strategy of one randomly selected nearest neighbour y. The strategy transfer occurs
with the probability
q~
1
1zexp Px{Py
 
K
  , ð3Þ
whereK is the uncertainty by strategy adoptions43.Without losing generality44, we use
K 5 0.5, so that it is very likely that better performing players will be imitated,
although those performing worse may occasionally be imitated as well.
As the key quantity, we measure the stationary fraction of cooperators
rc~L
{2
X
x
sx ?ð Þ, where sx ?ð Þ denotes the strategy of player x when the system
reaches dynamical equilibrium, i.e., when the average cooperation level becomes
time-independent. Moreover, we average the final outcome over 100 independent
initial conditions.
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